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included equal rights to manage
and control the partnership (Wash
Rev. Code §§ 25.04.180(5) and
.240(3)), equal access to the business records (Wash Rev. Code §
25.04.190), and limited transferability of the general partnership
interests (Wash Rev. Code §
25.04.180(7)). The general partnership agreement also provided that
Sadri and Teuscher were to share
the profits and losses equally. In
addition, the court noted that although Sadri presented evidence
that Teuscher had primary responsibility for managing BMS, Sadri
presented no evidence that
Teuscher prevented Sadri from exercising his partnership rights.
Therefore, because Sadri failed to
establish the third element of the
investment contract definition, the
court held that Sadri could not
recover under either the federal or
state securities laws.
The Washington Consumer
Protection Act
Sadri and the twelve limited
partners alleged that Teuscher's
misrepresentations also violated
Washington's Consumer Protection Act. Wash. Rev. Code §§
19.86.010 - .920 (1989) ("the

CPA"). Under the CPA, the plaintiff must prove (1) an unfair or
deceptive act or practice (2) in
trade or commerce (3) which affected the public interest; (4) injury
to plaintiff; and (5) a causal connection between the unfair or deceptive act and the injury suffered.
Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, Inc., 111 Wash. 2d 396,
759 P.2d 418, 422-423 (1988). On
appeal, Teuscher argued that Sadri
and the twelve limited partners
had not established the first, third
and fifth elements of the test. The
court rejected Teuscher's argument with respect to the limited
partners, but agreed that Sadri's
claim failed because he did not
establish that the deceptive acts
affected the public interest.
The Twelve Limited Partners.
The court stated that to prove the
first element, the plaintiff must
show that the alleged act had the
capacity to deceive a substantial
portion of the public. The plaintiff,
however, need not demonstrate
that the defendant actually inVolume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

tended to deceive anyone. The
court held that the twelve limited
partners satisfied this first element
by showing that the Teuscher's
misstatements were made to many
investors. In fact, Teuscher sought
out any investor who had large
amounts of cash. Thus, a substantial portion of the public could
have been deceived by Teuscher's
misstatements.
Next, the court addressed the
public interest element of the
twelve limited partners' CPA
claims. The defendant's acts affected the public interest if there is
a likelihood that others were injured in the same manner as the
plaintiffs. The court identified four
factors to be considered in determining whether the required public interest element of the CPA
claim was satisfied: (1) the act was
committed in the defendant's business; (2) the defendant advertised
to the public; (3) the plaintiff was
actively solicited by the defendant;
and (4) the plaintiff and defendant
occupied unequal bargaining positions. Not all of these factors need
be met, nor is any one dispositive.
In this case, Teuscher acted in
the scope of his business. He did
not advertise to find investors, but
he nonetheless actively solicited
investors. Teuscher occupied a superior bargaining position because
the twelve limited partners were
not sophisticated in the real estate
business and Teuscher was their
only source of information about
the investment. Taking all of the
factors into account, the court
found that the twelve limited partners had adequately established
the public interest element of their
CPA claims.
Finally, the court held that the
twelve limited partners had established the causation element of a
CPA claim. The court found that
had the twelve limited partners
known the truth about BMS, they
would not have invested. Therefore, the twelve limited partners
could recover under the CPA.
The General Partner. The court
held that Sadri, however, had
failed to prove his CPA claim. His
participation in the project was not
actively solicited by Teuscher.
Sadri was a sophisticated businessman with years of experience in

real estate development. He negotiated extensively with Teuscher
before forming the general partnership. Thus, the court held that
Sadri failed to meet the public
interest element of his CPA claim
because he did not prove that
Teuscher had superior bargaining
power. Therefore, the court reversed the jury's decision and directed judgment for Teuscher on
Sadri's CPA claim.
Sean J. Hardy

Tenth Circuit Holds that
Federal Common Law
Limits Uninsured
Depositors' Recovery
from Insolvent Lending
Institution to Pro Rata
Share of Assets
In Downriver Community Federal Credit Union v. Penn Square
Bank, 879 F.2d 754 (10th Cir.
1989), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that uninsured depositors who
were fraudulently induced to deposit money into the now-defunct
Penn Square Bank were entitled to
recover only a pro rata share of the
bank's assets. In so holding, the
court stated that federal common
law, rather than state law, governs
the post-insolvency relationship
between national banks and their
depositors.
Background: Credit Unions were
Fraudulently Induced to Purchase
Certificates of Deposit
In December 1981, Downriver
Community Federal Credit Union
("Downriver") and Wood Products Credit Union ("Wood Products") received glowing financial
reports regarding the Penn Square
Bank of Oklahoma City ("Penn
Square"). The reports were made
by investment brokers whose fees
were paid by Penn Square. In
reliance upon these reports, Downriver and Wood Products purchased 4.5 million dollars in Penn
(continued on page 50)
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Uninsured Depositors (from page49)
Square certificates of deposit. On
July 5, 1982, the Comptroller of
the Currency of the United States
declared Penn Square insolvent
and appointed as receiver the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). At that time, fortyseven commercial banks, fortyeight savings and loan institutions
and one hundred forty credit unions, including Downriver and
Wood Products, held uninsured
deposits in Penn Square.
Immediately following Penn
Square's collapse, Downriver and
Wood Products filed suit in the
United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma
charging Penn Square with knowingly or recklessly inducing their
deposits by issuing materially misleading financial statements.
District Court Imposes
Constructive Trust on Penn
Square Assets
The district court divided the
ensuing litigation into two discrete
phases: liability and remedy. The
first phase addressed whether Penn
Square and its directors fraudulently misrepresented the bank's
fiscal condition in its financial
statements, and whether Downriver and Wood Products relied on
those statements in purchasing the
certificates of deposit. Downriver
and Wood Products prevailed on
both issues.
The second phase of the trial
addressed the appropriate remedy.
The district court held that Oklahoma law governed the case. According to Oklahoma law, a court
may impose a constructive trust on
an insolvent bank's assets if three
conditions are met: the bank acquired the plaintiff's deposits by
fraud; the deposits increased the
bank's assets; and the court is able
to trace the plaintiff's deposits into
the defendant's assets. The district
court held that these three conditions were met. The court also
found that imposing a constructive
trust would not be unfair to Penn
Square's other depositors because
the constructive trust would have
only minimal impact on the assets

so

available to other depositors. In
addition, the other depositors also
could have sought constructive
trusts. Accordingly, the district
court imposed a constructive trust
on the amount of Downriver and
Wood Products' deposits and the
interest that had accrued to the
date of insolvency.
Court of Appeals: Federal Law
Applies Whenever a National
Bank is Declared Insolvent and
Placed Into Receivership
The court first addressed the
threshold issue of whether to apply
state or federal law. Downriver and
Wood Products argued that Oklahoma law governed their pre-insolvency relationship with Penn
Square and that, under Oklahoma
law, their deposits never became
part of Penn Square's assets because the deposits were obtained
by fraud.
The court of appeals agreed that
state law governs the relationship
between a national bank and its
depositors prior to the bank's insolvency. The court noted, however, that Congress has the paramount authority to regulate national banks. Therefore, state law
applies only in the absence of
federal law or, where there is federal law that regulates the banks,
state law applies only to the extent
that the state law does not conflict
with applicable federal law. Congress enacted the National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 - 216(d) (1988)
(originally enacted as an Act of
June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 5, 13 Stat.
100) ("the Act"), to govern insolvent banks. Therefore, the Act governs all claims on an insolvent
bank's assets.
The court recognized, however,
that the Act does not provide specific rules for distributing an insolvent bank's assets and therefore
does not address all of the problems that might arise in distributing the bank's assets. The court
held that to the extent that the Act
does not provide specific rules for
distribution, the equitable doctrines developed by the federal
courts apply. In other words, fed-

eral common law governs where
the Act does not provide a specific
rule governing insolvent banks.
Federal Common Law Precludes
Imposition of Constructive Trust
The court of appeals turned next
to the propriety of the district
court's remedy. Generally, in fashioning federal common law, federal courts may look for guidance
to the law of the state having the
closest connection to the transaction at issue. If, however, there is a
need for a uniform federal policy,
or if applying the state law would
interfere with congressional objectives, federal courts must turn to
federal law.
The court of appeals noted that,
in creating the Act, Congress
sought to achieve orderly liquidation of the insolvent bank's assets
and equitable distribution among
all creditors entitled to a share of
the bank's assets. Oklahoma law
permitted full restitution only to
some of an insolvent bank's depositors. The court held that this remedy would interfere with the Act's
objectives by disrupting the orderly distribution of the insolvent
bank's assets and favoring certain
creditors over others. Therefore,
the court refused to apply Oklahoma law to the case.
The court noted, however, that
under federal law a depositor could
establish a preferential claim to the
insolvent bank's assets if the
bank's fraud caused the depositor a
particular harm not shared by substantially all of the other depositors. The court found that many
other financial institutions had relied on the investment brokers'
financial reports in deciding to
deposit money into Penn Square.
The court held that because Downriver and Wood Products were not
unique in their reliance on these
reports, they could not obtain preferential claims to Penn Square's
assets.
Downriver and Wood Products
argued that the court still could
impose a constructive trust if all
depositors who relied on the financial reports filed a class action suit.
Volume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990
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The court rejected this argument.
If a class action suit were allowed,
uninsured depositors would race to
the FDIC in order to assert a
preferred claim. The court concluded that this result would make
a "mere mockery" of the equality
promised by the National Bank
Act. Where a fraud affected or
potentially affected all depositors,
all depositors should be treated the
same. Therefore, the court held
that a pro rata distribution of
assets among all of Penn Square's
depositors was the only fair remedy.
Eileen B. Libby

Mandatory Inclusion of
Commercial Leases in a
Cooperative Conversion
of Rent Stabilized
Apartments Did Not
Violate the Sherman Act
Recently, in 305 East 24th Owners Corp. v. Parman Co., 714 F.
Supp. 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the
United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York
held that a seller's including four
long term commercial leases in its
offer to convert rent stabilized
apartments into cooperative units
did not constitute an illegal tying
arrangement in violation of the
Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 7
(1989). In applying the Second
Circuit's five-pronged test to determine whether an illegal tying arrangement existed, the court ruled
that the tenants failed to show that
the sellers had economic power in
the tying product market or that
the seller's acts had a substantial
anticompetitive effect in the tied
product market. Additionally, the
court concluded that the commercial lease provision of the conversion contract was not unconscionable because the tenants had meaningful choices in deciding to enter
into the contract and the contract
terms were not unreasonably favorable to the sellers.
Volume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

Background
In August of 1980, Parman Co.
("Parman") submitted to the New
York State Attorney General a
preliminary offering plan to convert the rent stabilized apartments
at 305 East 24th Street to cooperative ownership. Under a cooperative conversion, the tenants purchase stock in and become sole
owners of the corporation that
owns the residence building. The
amount of stock a tenant owns
represents the value of that tenant's residence. Parman's preliminary offering plan provided that
any tenant who chose not to buy
into the cooperative would have to
vacate the building when it was
converted from an apartment to a
cooperative. In addition, the plan
required that Owners Corp. (the
corporation of tenants which
owned the building under the cooperative agreement) enter four
long term leases enabling the sellers to retain control of the commercial management services, garage services, laundry services, and
building management services.
The tenants formed the 305 East
24th Street Tenants' Association
("Tenants' Association" or "Association") and took a number of
actions to improve their position
in negotiating the cooperative conversion agreement. First, the Tenants' Association retained legal
counsel familiar with cooperative
conversions. Second, eighty percent of the tenants signed No-Buy
Agreements which stated that no
tenant who signed the Agreements
would purchase cooperative shares
until two thirds of the tenants
signed releases from the Agreements. Third, the Association sent
letters to the tenants on a continuing basis to inform them of the
progress in the negotiations. The
letters made particular reference to
the disputed long term leases.
On January 25, 1983, Parman
submitted a formal offering plan to
the New York State Attorney General's Office. The formal plan contained the same commercial lease
agreements. The cover of the plan
included the admonition "See
'Special Risks' Page 1" in bold
print. A portion of the "Special
Risks" section read, "These leases

may not be 'arms-length' transactions and may result in [Owners
Corp.] realizing less than the full
economic value of the garage space
and commercial space." (emphasis
in the original) Unlike the preliminary plan, however, the formal
plan proposed a non-eviction conversion. Thus, if a tenant chose not
to buy her shares of the cooperative, she could remain in the building as a rent stabilized tenant.
On August 12, 1983, the Tenants' Association sent Parman a
letter proposing to reduce the price
per share in the Owners Corp., to
reduce the downpayment required
to purchase shares, and to increase
the rent for the commercial leases.
On April 6, 1984, after negotiating
with the Tenants' Association, Parman amended the offering plan to
incorporate a number of the Association's demands: the price per
share in the Owners Corp. was
reduced by 25% for current tenants
buying into the cooperative; the
down payment was reduced from
10% of the purchase price to a flat
sum of one thousand dollars; Parman agreed to obtain financing for
those tenants unable to acquire it
otherwise; and Parman agreed to
pay thirty-five thousand dollars of
the Tenants' Association's legal
fees. The commercial leases were
left intact.
Following a Tenants' Association question and answer session
regarding the amended plan, the
Association's five-member Executive Committee recommended
that the tenants sign releases from
the No-Buy Agreements. By October 25, 1984, the date of the closing, eighty-five percent of the tenants had signed agreements with
Parman to buy shares in Owners
Corp.
Owners Corp. sued Parman in
the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New
York to prevent the conversion.
Owners Corp. argued that the conversion agreements violated the
Sherman Act antitrust provision
and that the commercial leases
were unconscionable.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Parman argued that the district
court did not have subject matter
(continued on page 52)
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